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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
LIABILITIES OF THIRD PARTIES
INTRODUcTION
The primary concern of this comment is an analysis of the rights
against and liabilities of third-party tortfeasors under the Florida Workmen's
Compensation Act.' Since the Florida decisions under this section are
limited in number, and in view of the fact that the 1959 Legislature has
enacted substantial amendments to this section, 2 it will at times be
necessary to discuss analagous cases under similar statutes from other
juridictions.
WHo Is A THIRD PARTY UNDER THE Act?
Since the Florida Act does not define "third-party tortfeasor," but
merely states the rights which may be asserted against him, it is necessary
to resort to judicial decisions in determining the parties included within
that phrase.
Strangers:
An employee does not lose his common law right of action for
negligence against a stranger who caused his injury, unless the act expressly
prohibits such actions.' "From a reading of the Act, it is perfectly evident
that the legislature contemplated that third parties might be responisible
for commensurable injuries.'" 4
Fellow-Employees:
Fellow-employees are held to be third-party tortfeasors within the
meaning of the Florida act, and thus are subject to liability for their
negligent acts causing injuries to other workers, even though the common-
employer's liability is limited by the statute. The court stated in Frantz V.
MeBee Co.:5
We hold . . . in accordance with the almost universal rule in
those jurisdictions where there is no express legislative mandate
to the contrary, that a co-employee or fellow servant is a "third-
party tort-feasor" within the meaning of our Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1957).
2. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-431, H.B. N& 764, 37th
GE.. SEss., Fla. (1959).
3. Hartquist v. Tarniami Trail Tours, 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939).
4. Weathers v. Catthen, 152 Fla. 420, 422, 12 So.2d 294, 295 (1943).5. 77 So.2d 796, 800 (F-a. 1955).
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At common law one servant is liable to another for his own mis-
feasance. Under the terms of the Compensation Act the liability of the
employer is specifically set forth, thus substituting a limited statutory
liability for a common law liability. Since there is no corresponding
statutory requirement imposed upon fellow servants, there is no reason
why any implied exemption from suit should be read into the statute.6
General Contractors:
There are three views on the question of whether or not a general
contractor is a third-party tortfeasor under the applicable terms of work-
men's compensation acts:
1. Under the terms of some statutes, the general contractor is subject
to statutory liability only in the event that the subcontractor does not
comply with the statutory requirements.7 This has the effect of making
the subcontractor primarily liable for compensation benefits to the injured
employee, whereas the general contractor is now only secondarily liable.9
Thus, in the event an employee of a subcontractor is negligently injured
by the general contractor or his employees, and the subcontractor is
covered under the act, the general contractor is liable as a third-party
tortfeasor.
Under section 56 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law
it was held in Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Constr. Co.9 that an employee of a
subcontractor whose injury arose out of and in the course of employment
was not precluded from bringing a common law action for negligence
against the general contractor. The couit held:
Since the general contractor has always been deemed to be a
third party with respect to the sub contractor's employee, it follows
that the latter can bring an action for negligence against the
general contractor under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
§ 29, subd. 1 ....
It is difficult to find in section 56 any expression of legislative
intent to destroy this common law negligence action ... 90
6. Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S.W.2d 497 (1931);
accord, Frantz v. MeBec Co., 77 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1955); Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo.
1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950); Wors v. Tarton, 234 Mo. App. 1173, 95 S.W,2d
1199 (1936),
. Se, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 81-1306 (Supp. 1957); Miss. CoVE ANN. § 6998-04
(Supp. 1958); Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.040"(4) (1949); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAw§ 56 (where contract "involves or includcs" hazardous employment); OKiA. STAT. tit. 85,
§ 11 (1958).
S. TIhoimas v. Ceorge Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959);
Baldwin v. Maner, 224 Ark. 348, 273 S.W.2d 28 (1954); Mosley v. Jones, 224 Miss.
725, 80 So.2d 819 (1955); Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Constr. Co,, 295 N.Y. 306, 67 N.E.2d
369 (1946); Clark v. Monarch Eng'r Co., 248 N.Y. 107, 161 N.E. 436 (1928).
9. 295 N.Y. 306, 67 N.E.2d 369 (1946).
10. Id. at 311, 67 N.E.2d at 371.
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In the case of Anderson v. Sanderson & Porter," the Arkansas court,
in interpreting its Vorkmen's Compensation Statute, which is similar
to the New York statute discussed in the Sweezey case, stated:
The courts which have considered the question of the- "third
party" liability of a general contractor to the employees of an
insured sub contractor ... have usually held that since the general
contractor is not the employer of the employees of his sub
contractors and is liable for compensation only to the employees
of an uninsured sub contractor, the general contractor is as to the
employees of an insured sub contractor, a "third party."' 2
The policy behind this result appears to be that since the general
contractor is no longer subject to statutory liability, it is only just that
he be subject to common law liability.
2. A minority of jurisdictions have held a general contractor liable
as a third-party tortfeasor in an action by the injured employee of a
subcontractor.' 3 It has been recognized that on the one hand, there are
employers "endeavoring to escape the effect of the Compensation Act"
in order to avoid paying compensation; and on the other hand, the same
employers "strive vigorously to come under the sheltering protection of
the act. '" 4 While this leads to an equitable result in some cases, it also
leads to confusion since there might be a tendency for the courts to
construe these statutes more in accordance with their own individual
notions of justice, rather than in accordance with the intent of the
legislature. This might, on numerous occasions, frustrate the true legislative
determination of the word "employer."
3. The third view, with which Florida is in accord, is that a general
contractor is not a third-party tortfeasor within the meaning of the Act.'5
11. 146 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1945).
12. Id. at 60.
13. See, e.g., E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F.2d 318 (8th
Cir. 1947) (Minn. statute applied); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Constr. Co., 97
F. Supp. 316 (E. I). Va. 1951 ) (District of Columbia statute applied); McGann v. Moss,
50 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1943) (Va. statute applied); Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105,
141 A.2d 768 (1958); Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Constr. Co., 295 N.Y. 306, 67 N.E.2d
369 (1946); Paulsen v. Kahn, 24 App. Div. 744, 288 N.Y. Supp. 622 (1936);
Sher v. Roth-Sclhenker Corp., 72 N.YS.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
14. McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 292, 153 Atl. 424 425 (1930).
15. Corban v. Skelley Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958) (Ark. statute
applied); Kaufman v. Bowman, 193 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1951) (Conn. statute applied);
Rivera v. Turner Constr. Co., 135 F. Stpp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (Pa. statute applied);
Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 224 Ark. 593, 273 S.W.2d 28 (1954); Brown v. Arrington
Coustr. Co., 74 Idaho 338, 262 P.2d 789 (1953); Whitaker v. I)ouglas, 179 Kan. 64,
292 P.2d 688 (1956); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 223
La. 794, 66 So.2d 852 (1953); Sisk v. L. 'N. Eaton Co., 89 So.2d 425 (La. App. 1956);
Kegley v. Vulcan Rail & Constr. Co., 203 Md. 476, 101 A.2d 822 (1954); State v.
City of Baltimore, 199 Md. 289, 86 A.2d 618 (1952); Cozzo v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
299 Mass. 260, 12 N.E.2d 744 (1938); Mosley v. Jones, 224 Miss. 725, 80 So.2d
819 (1955); Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.V.2d 153 (1938); Simon SeN.,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 73 Nev. 9, 307 P.2d 110 (1957); Jordan v. Champlin Ref. Co., 200
Okla. 604, 198 P.2d 408 (1948); Sarne y. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 370 Pa. 82,
87 A.2d 264 (1952); Adams v. Hercules Powder Co., 180 'reun. 340, 175 S.W,2d
319 (1943).
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This view appears to be the one followed in the majority of jurisdictions
which have statutes, the effect of which is similar to that of the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Act, under which the general employer is
deemed to be the "statutory employer" of all employees of subcontractors.' 0
Florida Statute, section 440.10 (1957) provides:
In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his contract
work to a sub-contractor or sub-contractors, all of the employees
engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed
in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor
shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of compensation
to all such employees ...
Under Florida Statute, section 440.11 (1957) this liability of the general
contractor is exclusive of all other liability. In Brickley v. Gulf Coast
Constr. Co.,17 the widow of a deceased employee of a subcontractor
brought a common law action against the general contractor to recover
damages for negligence. Dismissal of the action was affirmed by the
supreme court on the ground that the remedy under the act was exclusive,
since the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law "make it
entirely clear" that all employees of subcontractors are statutory employees
of the general contractor. Although it is not so stated by the court, the
inference to be drawn is that a general contractor is not a third-party
tortfeasor within the ineaning of the act.
Under a similar statute the court, in Bogratt v. Pratt 6 Whitney
Aircraft Co., 8 held that an employcc of a subcontractor who received
compensation, could not recover at common law from the general con-
tractor. The court indicated that the provisions of section 5226 of the
Connecticut act made it "entirely clear" that as between employees and
employers the remedy under the act is exclusive of all other remedies,
and that under the act the general contractor is the employer of all
employees engaged in the common enterprise.
'The same result has been reached under the Missouri statute, 9 which
is similar to the New York statute20 in making the general contractor
16. See, e.g., CONN. Gr. S'rvT. § 31-154 (1958) (principal employer liable to
pay all compensation to same extent as if work were done without intervention of
subcontractor); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1010 (1949) ("employer" includes proprietor
of business who by reason of there being an independent contractor, or for any other
reason, is not the direct employer of workmen there employed); OKLA. S'rAT. tit. 85,
§ 11(2) (Supp. 1958) (if principal employer fails to secure compliance with act
by his independent contractor, employee may proceed against principal employer);
PA. STAT. tit. 77, § 52 (1952) (employer liable to laborers of subcontractors to same
extent as to his own employees).
17. 153 Fla. 216, 14 So.2d 265 (1943).
18. 114 Conn. 126, 157 Ati. 860 (1932); accord, Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co.,
136 Cotn. 529, 72 A.2d 655 (1950); Black v. Stone & WVcbster's Eng'r Corp., 181 Misc.
854, 49 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
19. Mo. Rcv. STAT. § 287.040 (1949).
20. N.Y. \ORKMI:EN'S COMP. LAw § 56.
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secondarily liable for compensation. However, under the Missouri statute
it was expressly provided that a general contractor "shall be deemed"
to be the employer of his subcontractor's employees. 21
Thc purpose of such provisions is to protect employees from irresponsible
employers who might attempt to evade their responsibility by hiring
incompetent subcontractors, or by parcelling out their work to subcontrac-
tors not employing enough workmen to bring them under the act. A
holding that a general contractor is a "third-party" would in effect be
either: (1) a holding that he is not an "employer," thus defeating the
legislative intent; or (2) a holding that lie is subject to a double liability,
which definitely does not appear to be the legislative intent.
Subcontractors:
The Florida Supreme Court held, in Younger v. Giler Contracting
Co.,22 that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act have
changed the common law rule, so that an employee of a general contractor
may no longer bring a tort action against a subcontractor, either for his
own negligence or for the negligence of his employees. The court stated:
The intention of the legislature . . . was to abrogate the common
law to the extent of making all of the employees engaged in a
common enterprise statutory fellow servants. . . . We cannot
garner any other meaning from the statute except that the
employces of the subcontractor and the general contractor were
to be on an equal footing....
The subcontractor is not "some person other than the employer"
against which "third person" a common-law action for damages
may be iauintained .... -
In Miami Roofing 6 Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt24, the holding of the
Younger case - was extended to include a third-party action by an employee
of one subcontractor against another subcontractor engaged in a common
enterprise. The court observed:
[T]licre would appear to be no basis for giving a greater right
or benefit to an employee, simply because his injury happened
to occur by reason of the negligence of the employee of another
subcontractor, rather than by the negligence of an employee of
the general contractor .... 2
An employee of a general contractor engaged in the construction of
a housing development was injured when struck by a concrete mixer
21. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Boaz-Kid Constr. Co,, 115 F.2d 950 (8th Cir.
1940); Jones v. Lily Tulip Cup Corp., 158 F. Supp. 944 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Montgomety
v. Mine La Motte Corp., 304 S.V.2d 885 (Mo. 1957); Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274,
121 S.W .2d 153 (1938).
22. 143 Fla. 335, 196 So. 690 (1940).
23. Id. at 341-42, 196 So. at 693.
24. 48 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1950).
25. 143 Fla. 335, 196 So. 690 (1940).
26. Miami Roofing & Sheet Mctal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So.2d 840, 842 (Ma. 1950).
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owned by the defendant. An action at law was brought by the injured
enployce on the ground that the defendant was a "third-party" and not
a subcontractor. The defendant, at the time of the injury, was engaged
in delivering ready-mix concrete to the project under a contract with the
general contractor. In view of the fact that the rule restricting employees
of general contractors and subcontractors to the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is a harsh one, the supreme court refused to extend
it further, and held the defendant to be a "materialman" rather than
a subcontractor.27 This had the effect of limiting the decision of the
Younger case by making it possible to distinguish factual situations, thus
enabling the court to find that a subcontractor is not a "subcontractor."
Although a minority of jurisdictions are in accord with the Florida
view that a subcontractor is not a third party within the meaning of the
act,2D a majority of courts hold that a subcontractor is subject to common
law liability as a third-party tortfeasor 30
In considering these cases one becomes aware of the perplexing
uncertainties which may arise when trying to ascertain whether or not a
defendant in a common law action brought by an employee is a contractor,
subcontractor, or third-party tortfeasor. It therefore appears that a further
clarification of these issues by the legislature would be most helpful.
Independent Contractors:
Under Florida Statute section 440.10 (1957), which has the effect
of making a general contractor the statutory employer of employees of
subcontractors, no mention is made of "independent contractors"; under
Florida Statute 440.02(c)(1) the term "employee" does not include
independent contractors. Th1e inference from these sections is that the
legislature did not intend the indcpendcnt contractor to be immune
from common law actions by employees of those parties with whom he
deals in the course of his business. The courts have carried out this
legislative intent by allowing actions against independent contractors as
third parties.3' Although decisions on this point have not been too
27. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1958).
28. But see Smith v. Poston Eqtnip. Rentals, 105 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1958).
29. Kieffer v. Walsh Constr. Co., 140 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Scott v.
Savannah Elec. Co., 84 Ga. App. 553, 66 S.E.2d 179 (1951); Clark v. M. W. Leahy Co.,
Inc., 300 Mass. 565. 16 N.E.2d 57 (1938); Pimental v. John E. Cox Co., 299 Mass. 579,
13 N.E.2d 441 (1938); Dresser v. New Hampshire Structural Steel Co., 296 Mass. 97,
4 N.E.2d 1012 (1936); Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957).
30. Brown v. Arrington Constr. Co., 74 Idaho 338, 262 P.2d 789 (1953); Davison v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 169 Kan. 256, 218 P.2d 219 (1950); McCourtie v.
United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958); State ex rel.
W. J. Menefee Constr, Co. v. Curtis,-No.App.-, 321 S.V.2d 713 (1959); Portman v.
Hannian Bldg. Corp., 131 Misc, 168, 226 'N.Y. Supp. 395 (City Ct. 1928); Olsen v.
Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.WN.2d II (1950); Goodwin v. Wilhelm Steel Constr. Co.,
-- Tex.Civ.App.-, 311 S.W.2d 510 (1958).
31. Rainsford v. McArthur Dairies, 114 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1959); Goldstein v. Acme
Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1958); Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So.2d 285
(Fla. 1954).
[VOL. XIV
LIABILITIES OF THIRD PARTIES
numerous, the courts have indicated that to hold otherwise would put an
unreasonable restraint upon the rights of injured employees.82
A contrary result has been reached in jurisdictions having similar
statutes, but which, unlike Florida, have the effect of making a general
contractor the statutory employer not only of employees of his sub-
contractors, but also of employees of independent contractors engaged in
the common enterprise. 33
Because of the restricted monetary benefits available to employees
under such acts, it appears that the Florida Act gives rise to a more
equitable solution of the problem by insuring a minimum recovery for
injuries, and at the same time allowing an opportunity to recover greater
damages from a third-party tortfeasor.
CONCURRENT RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND ACTION AT LAW
Prior to 1951, the injure demployee was required to elect whether to
accept compensation benefits, or to pursue his remedy at law against
the third party.34 Once an employee elected to accept compensation, he
lost his right to maintain or control any action against a third party.
Many times this resulted in an injustice to the employee, particularly
in situations where the workmen's compensation carrier was also the
carrier for the negligent third party. In such situations it was to the interest
of the insurance carrier in collecting from the third party to limit the
damages to the amount it was required to pay under the act; whereas,
it was to the interest of the employee to recover fully for injuries not
covered by the act. 5 Presently under the Florida act an employee may
accept compensation benefits and at the same time bring an action at
law against a third party tortfcasor3 1 In Fidelity 6 Cas. Co. of N.Y. v.
Bedingfield,37 the court stated:
The 1951 amendment . . . made drastic changes. It abolished the
election requirement, and provides that an injured employee may
claim workmen's compensation benefits and at the same time
institute suit against a third-party tortfeasor . . . This amendment
simply gives the injured employee the right to control his own
law suit against a third-party tortfeasor, and provides for limited
subrogation on an equitable basis.
32. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202, 205 (Fla. 1958).
33. See, e.g. LA. Riwv. STAT. § 23:1061 (1950); OKLa. S'rAT. tit. 88, § 11 (1958).
34. Haverty Furniture Co. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 154 Fla. 772, 19 So.2d 59(1944); Plunkett v. Florida Power & Light Co., I F.C.R. 35 (Fla.IndComm. 1954)
(injury occurred prior to amendment).
35. Fidelity & Cas, Co. of N. Y. v. Bedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952).
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(1) (1957).
37. 60 So.2d 489, 493-94 (Fla. 1952).
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Formerly, sonic jurisdictions chose not to give the employee a concurrent
right against his employer and the third party responsible for the injury;3
however, the current trend is in accord with the Florida view. "" One of the
first major states to provide a concurrent right for employees was New
York. Thus, today under section 29 of the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law it is unnecessary for the injured employee to choose
between taking compenastion and bringing an action against the third
party.4 It was several years before the Florida legislature condescended
to follow in the footsteps of New York.
SUBROGATION OF THE EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE CARRIER TO THE
RIGHTS OF TIE EMPLOYEE
Although, as stated above, an injured employee has a concurrent right
to compensation and to pursue his remedy in an action at law against a
third party, if lie accepts compensation or other benefits, then under
section 440.39(2) his employer or insurance carrier is subrogated to his
rights.
Formerly this section read, exclusive of parenthetical phrases, substan-
tially as follows:
If the employee or his dependents shall accept compensation
(or other) benefits . . . the employer or, . . . the insurer, shall
be subrogated to the rights of the employee . . . against such
third-party tortfeasor, to the extent of the amount of compensa-
tion benefits paid (or to be paid) .... 41
The 1959 session of the legislature in amending the act, added the above
phrases enclosed in the parenthesis.42
In Arex Indem. Co. v. Radina43 the carrier paid compensation to
an injured employee and received subrogation in an action by the employee
against the third-party tortfeasor.4 Thereafter the carrier refused to pay
further benefits. The Industrial Commission awarded continued payments,
and the carrier sought additional subrogation. This was disallowed by
the court on the ground that the statute failed to provide for subrogation
to the extent of benefits payable in the future. The court was explicit
in stressing that:
38. See, e.g., Marion County Constr, Co. v. Kimberlin. 96 Ind. App. 145, 184
N.E. 574 (1933); Becker v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 279 Mass. 435, 181 N.E. 757
(1932); Breital v. llinderstein, 236 App. Div. 203, 258 N.Y. Snpp. 237 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
rff'd. 261 N.Y. 556, 185 N.E. 736 (1933); D. F. Tyler Corp. v. Evans, 156 Va. 576,
159 S.E. 393 (1931).
39. See, e.g., CAL. LAS. CODE § 3852; IND. ANN. S'rAT. § 40-1213 (Stpp. 1957);
KAN. CEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. VoRKMEN'S Comp. LAw § 29;
VA, CODE ANN. §§ 65-37 to -39, 65-108 (1950).
40. Taylor v. New York Cent. R.R., 294 N.Y. 397, 62 N.E.2d 777 (1945).
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(2) (1957).
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(2) (1957), al amended by ch. 59-431, .IB. No. 764, 37th
C.N. Sss., Fla. (1959).
43. 77 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1955).
44. Arex Indern. Co. v. Radin, 72 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
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IT]he claim is for a benefit or remedy which the legislaturelas not provided, and one which, subrogation being a matter of
grace, rests entirely within its (the legislature's) discretion to
grant or withhold. . . . (Emphasis added.) 4"
Since the legislature has now exercised its discretion to grant the additional
subrogation which was sought in the Arex Indemn. case,48 it is apparent
that the protection afforded insurance carriers and employers has been
further broadened by this progressive move on the part of the Florida
Legislature.
The majority of jurisdictions are in accord with Florida in providing
for subrogation of the employer or insurance carrier.47 However, some
states, such as New Jersey, have limited the right of subrogation to the
employer.48 It is interesting to note that some jurisdictions, such as
Massachusetts, have taken the position that the right of an insurance
carrier under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is wholly a creature of
statute, and is not dependent upon the principle of subrogation.49
Under a statute similar to the previous Florida statute, the harshness
of the provision requiring that compensation must have been actually
paid before the right of subrogation accrued to the carrier or employer
was avoided. In Furlong v. Cronan,50 the court held that payment of
compensation was not a condition precedent to maintaining the action
against the tortfeasor, since the court itself could stay proceedings, or
otherwise exercise control over the action, until compensation had actually
been paid.
Although the courts have used various phraseology in arriving at their
conclusions, the results reached, as a practical matter, have given rise to
subrogation of the employer or insurance carier.
PARTIES ENTITLED TO SUE; REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF PAYMENT OF
COMPENSATION; DISTRIBUTION OF RECOVERY
The 1959 session of the Florida Legislature, in amending section
440.39(3) (a), added the following phrases enclosed in parentheses:
In (all claims or) actions at law against a third-party tortfcasor....
Upon suit being filed . . . the court may determine to be their
pro rata share for compensation benefits paid (or to be paid) ....
This section of the statute specifically provides that the parties entitled to
sue a third-party tortfeasor are: the employee, his dependents, or "those
entitled by law to sue in the event he is deceased."
45. Arex Indem. Co. v. Radin, 77 So.2d 839, 840-41 (Fla. 1955).
46. 77 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1955).
47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852; ILL. RiV. STAT. ch. 48, § 166 (1950); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 34:15-40 (1959); N.Y. VORKMEN'S Co~xp. LAW § 29; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 671 (Supp. 1958).
48. N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-40 (Supp. 1958).
49. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Tiuse & Carleton, Inc., 272 Mass. 448, 172
N.E. 590 (1930).
50. 305 Mass. 464, 26 N.E.2d 382 (1910).
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The purpose of this provision, as noted in Mcoy v. Florida Power 6
Light Co., '1 is to protect workers and their dependents from the hardships
which 'occur when the worker is injured or killed in the course of his
employment, and to prevent the dependents "from becoming charges upon
the community." In that case the widow and the dependent mother of
the deceased employee received compensation benefits. Subsequently the
widow and mother brought an action against the third-party tortfeasor.
The widow dismissed her suit, and the question arose as to whether the
dependent mother could maintain the action alone. In affirming a summary
judgment for the defendant, the court held that section 440.39 did not
grant any special concessions irrespective of the Wrongful Death Statute.52
As pointed out by the court, the decision seems to be consistent with
the legislative intent, but since compensation benefits are limited in amount,
a more liberal construction of the statutes might have better served to
prevent the mother from becoming a "charge upon the community."
Under the act the employer or insurance carrier may file a notice of
compensation paid in a suit by the employee against the third party. Upon
filing and recording of such notice, the employer or carrier has a lien upon
any "judgment recovered" and is entitled to a pro rata share of the
recovery. In United States Cas. Co. v. Hume, 3 after notice had been
filed by the carrier, the trial court denied the carrier's motion for an order
of distribution of its pro rata share on the ground there was no "judgment
recovered" as provided by the act. The trial court had approved a settle-
ment between the plaintiff-employec and the defendant-tortfeasor. On
appeal, it was held that a court-approved settlement was a "judgment
recovered" within the meaning of section 440.39(3). Although the above
decision undoubtedly reached a just result, this problem will no longer
arise since the legislature has now seen fit, through the addition of sub-
section (b), to alleviate any further difficulty in this area. If any settlement
is made with a third-party tortfeasor, either before or after filing suit, the
circuit court now has authority to determine the amount payable out of
the settlement to the employer or carrier.
Difficulty at times arises in determining the amount of the pro rata
share to be distributed. In Arex Indent. Co. v. Radin,54 an employer's
insurance carrier brought an action for its pro rata share of a partial
recovery by the employee from a third-party tortfeasor. The court stated:
[T]he words "pro rata" . . . when considered in the light of the
remainder of the paragraph and its evident purpose, must be
construed in its broadest aspect and not in a technical manner
.... (Emphasis added.) 5"
51. 87 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1956).
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1953); cf. Vanlandingham v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
154 Fla. 628, 18 So.2d 678 (1944) (Workrocn's Compensation Act did not impliedly
repeal Wrongful Death Statute),
53. 112 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1959).
54. 72 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
55. Id. at 395.
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The court refused to set up any formula for determining a pro rata share,
and indicated that if the standard of "equitable distribution" was inadequate,
any change should be by the legislature and not the courts. The legislative
standard of "equitable distribution" thus gives rise to a large amount of
discretion in the trial courts.
The legislature has remedied the inequitable results of cases such as
Baughman v. Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co.,56 by providing, as indicated above,
that the pro rata share of recovery shall include not only amounts of
compensation which have been actually paid, but also those which are
to be paid. In the Baughman case5 7 it was held that in actions by the
employee under section 440.39(3) the court is only empowered to determine
the pro rata share for benefits paid.
In a negligence action by the employee against the tortfeasor, some of
the elements of damages to be considered are future pain and suffering,
future loss of earnings, future medical expenses, ctc. Likewise, in workmen's
compensation proceedings the carrier (or employer) may be burdened
with future expenses from injuries sustained by the employee. It therefore
appears that in view of these potential burdens which may be thrust upon
the shoulders of those responsible under the act, the Florida Legislature in
amending this section has taken a most realistic and equitable approach.
Under section 440.39(4)(a) if an employee fails to bring an action
against a third-party tortfeasor within one year after the cause of action
accrues, the cause of action is automatically assigned to the employer or
insurance carrier, whichever the case may be. In the event of a recovery
against or settlement with the third party, the employer (or carrier) is
entitled to retain all amounts paid as compensation to the employee,
together with "the present value of all future compensation benefits
payable," to be held as a trust fund from which to make future payments
of compensation. Any excess is to be paid to the employee. Sub-section (b),
which was added by the 1959 legislature, in effect provides that if the
employer (or carrier) does not bring suit within two years following the
accrual of the cause of action, the right of action reverts to the employee.
The result of this section is to limit the employer's right of action to
one year.
This time limitation provision in the Florida act is in accord with
the provisions of a number of other jurisdictions. 8 Since the employer
56. 78 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955).
57. Ibid
58. Izt. Relv. STAT. Ch. 48, § 166 (1950) (any time prior to three months before
said action would be barred at law); MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 152, § 15 (1958) ("if, in
any ease where the employee has claimed or received compensation within six months
of the injury, the insurer does not proceed to enforce such liability within a period of
nine months after said injury, the employee may so proceed."); N.J. Rrv. STA'r.
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or insurance carrier is given a right of subrogation under the act, it seems
only just that he should be given an opportunity to protect that right.
Otherwise, an employee - either through inadvertence or neglect - might
be able to defeat the employer's right of subrogation by failure to pursue
the remedy against the third party.
Under section 440.39(5), if suit is instituted by employer or carrier,
a settlement with the third party is prohibited unless the employee's
consent is obtained.
CONCLUSION
The major deficiency under this section of the Workmen's Conpen-
sation Act is the failure of the legislature to define in any way the phrase
"third-party tortfeasor." There is a need for a definition of this term in
order to avoid the many hazy areas which now are clouded by uncertainties.
A possible solution to this problem would lie in an addition to the
definition section of the act.
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act as a whole is:
[So that employees could be at least partially compensated for
injuries received in highly organized and hazardous industries of
modern times whether the iniury was caused by negligence of the
employer or otherwise. . . (Emphasis added.) '
It is suggested that the Florida act should be extended by making the
general contractor the statutory employer not only of employees of his
subcontractors (as now provided) but also of employees of independent
contractors. This would not only better effectuate the purpose of the act,
but would also eliminate the difficulties presented to the courts, parties
involved, and attorneys in determining whether or not a particular indi-
vidual is a subcontractor or independent contractor. If this were done,
the need for the distinction would no longer exist.
In general, it can be said that the legislature over the years has made
notable strides in the furtherance of fitting the usefulnss of the XVorkmen's
Compensation Act to the needs of modern times. The 1959 session of the
legislature is evidence of this trend.
It is hoped that in years to come Florida will continue to make an
effort in gauging its compensation laws to the evcr increasing needs of
a community which is one of the fastest growing in the United States.
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§ 34:15-40(f) (1959) (one year after the accident); N.Y. \VORKM EN'S Comp. LAw
§ 29 (not later than six months after the awarding of compensation and in any event
before the expiration of one year from the date such action accrues).
59. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y, v. Bedingfie]d, 60 So.2d 489, 492 (Fla. 1952);
LARSON, WORKMNEN'S COMPENSATION § 2,20 (1952).
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